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Abstract: Using psychological theory in agent formalisations is relevant to capture behavioural phenomena in
simulationmodels (Enhance RealismOf Simulation - EROS). Whereas the potential contribution of psychologi-
cal theory is important, also a number of challenges and problems in doing so are discussed. Next examples of
implementations of psychological theory are being presented, ranging from simple implementations (KISS) of
rather isolated theories to extendedmodels that integrate dierent theoretical perspectives. The role of social
simulation in developing dynamic psychological theory and integrated social psychological modelling is dis-
cussed. We conclude with some fundamental limitations and challenges concerning the modelling of human
needs, cognition and behaviour.
Keywords: Psychology, Theory, Needs, Norms, Cognition, Attitudes
Figure 1: Revived by Eros’s (or Cupid’s) Kiss. Antonio Canova (1757-1822). Musée du Louvre.
Introduction
1.1 "EROS" was mentioned by Rosaria Conte aloud in reply to a plea for keeping our simulated agents simple and
stupid (KISS). KISS advocates startingwith the simplestmodel, and only expand themodel when this is needed
to explain and understand the phenomenon of interest. However, when theories are available that describe
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a certain process in human behaviour, implementing these theoretical notions in the model fosters the sim-
ulation’s realism and validity of results. Enhancing Realism Of Simulation, EROS, clearly refers to including
psychological realism in the agents we model. At the SIMSOC meeting in Cortona in 1997 this was debated,
and later the introduction of KIDS âĂŞ Keep It Descriptive Stupid (Edmonds & Moss 1984) further contributed
to the discussion of how to approach certain modelling challenges. KIDS starts with modelling a certain phe-
nomenon as straightforward as possible, taking into account the widest possible range of evidence, including
qualitative data such as anecdotes and expert opinions. Simplification is only applied when and if the model
and evidence justify this. In the current paper, twenty years aer Rosaria called for EROS, we want to reflect
on how psychological theories have been used to capture aspects of psychological reality into enhancing the
models used in social simulation. The focus will mainly be at the more social-psychological theories because
these are in particular relevant for the interaction between people, an aspect that is critical in social simula-
tion. We also will highlight a few challenges and limitations we identify for modelling psychologically relevant
drivers and processes into computer simulation models, and the still limited contribution of social simulation
to the field of psychology. Whereas a citation analysis of JASSS demonstrates a considerable influence from
psychology (and the social sciences in general) on social simulation papers, these JASSS publications seem to
go quite unnoticed by the field of psychology (e.g., Squazzoni & Casnici 2013). However, considering that social
simulation is increasingly being recognised as a relevant researchmethodology to studybehavioural dynamics,
there appears to be an increasing interest for applications in the more regular social scientific journals such as
the European Psychologist (Conte & Giardini 2016), the Journal of Environmental Psychology (e.g., Jager & Ernst
2017) and Social Psychological and Personality Science (Jackson et al. 2016). Here, we also discuss the relevance
of social simulation for dynamic theory development in psychology, and address how formal modelling may
contribute todevelopingadynamical andcausal perspectiveonmicroandmacro level interactions. Sucha the-
ory developmentwould contribute to connecting social scientific fields that study behaviour on dierent levels
of aggregation, most notably cognitive psychology, social psychology and sociology. Considering that the field
of psychology is currently still being dominated by the development of micro-level theories and is plagued by
problems of replication, the sculpture of Canova fits with our ideas that enhancing realism of simulations also
contributes to the awakening of the field of psychology for developing integrative and dynamic theories of be-
haviour that contribute to our understanding of the operation of our own species. Considering the challenges
that we face as humanity, developing solid theory on behavioural dynamics appears to be an urgent research
priority.
The Relevance of Psychology in Social Simulation
2.1 Social simulation proves to be a powerful tool to model individual agents, their interaction among themselves
andwith theenvironment they share. Usingagentbasedmodelling techniques allows for computer experimen-
tation with the micro-macro relations determining the oen complex social dynamics that are hard to isolate
in the real world. Obviously, simulationmodels oer a simplified representation of the complex reality they try
to study. The KISS principle stresses that Keeping It Simple Stupid contributes to the researcher’s capacity of
understanding the results obtained with the models. However, at the same time we are aware of drivers and
processes that are important in the context of human decisionmaking in a social context. For example, inman-
aging our limited cognitive resources, we oen scrutinise the behaviour of similar people to identify potentially
interesting behaviours. Manypsychological theories address the dierent processes anddrivers that play a role
in how we learn from the experiences and opinions of other people. Including such psychological theories in
social simulation models not only aects the individual agent behaviour, but also has impacts on the macro-
level societal behaviour, and hence have an impact on the environment the agents live in, e.g. the availability
of resources (Janssen 2006). In understanding for example tipping points in social systems (Nyborg et al. 2016)
where social forces flip from hampering behavioural change towards promoting it, it is therefore important
to address social drivers such as conformism, anti-conformism and non-conformism as well as social learn-
ing strategies, imitation and social comparison processes. Moreover, it seems critical to address heterogeneity
concerning these social drivers in the population as an important aspect of the social fabric aecting social dy-
namics. For example, innovation diusion theory clarifies that innovators, opinion leaders and followers have
a dierent perspective on social outcomes (Rogers 1993). Where innovators are more likely to experiment with
new behaviours, and are hardly susceptible for the opinion of other people, opinion leaders are usually much
more aware of their role in the social network. As a result, they also are likely to consider the social impacts
of adopting a new behaviour. Followers are even more susceptible for social outcomes, and are only adopting
new behaviour when they observe it is socially acceptable. Addressing this heterogeneity in social susceptibil-
ity is a key element in understanding how social forces aect the spreading of new behaviours through social
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systems (Van Eck et al. 2011).
2.2 Several more generic psychological theories are available and being used to understand a variety of specific
societal relevant issues such as waste reduction and recycling, energy use and food consumption, transporta-
tion behaviour, migration and acculturation, social conflict and polarisation. All these issues deal with social
dynamics that develop over longer time-spans, and where the interactions between the individual behaviour
at the micro-level and the societal macro-level play a central role. Hence there seems to be a valid reason for
exploring the possibilities of implementing behavioural theory in agent based models to study behaviour the-
oretical mechanisms in a social dynamical context.
Challenges and Problems in Formalising Psychological Theory
3.1 Social simulation oers a computational tool to explore micro-macro relations in social systems, and beyond,
e.g. socio-economical and socio-ecological systems. Computational experiments make it possible to exper-
iment with large heterogeneous populations over long periods of time to systematically study how certain
assumptions on behaviour have an impact on social dynamics and beyond. A classic example would be the
Schelling model (1971), demonstrating how a slight preference of individuals (micro level) for being in a ma-
jority position results in a complete segregation (macro-level), which contributed to our understanding of the
social dynamics of e.g. ethnic segregation.
3.2 Key to the explanatory power of such simulation experiments are the assumptions used in formalising the
micro-level behavioural rules of the agents. For example, it is possible to formalise simulated agents as out-
comemaximising decision makers with perfect knowledge of their environment. This maximising assumption
confronts themodeller with numerous challenges, such as the degree to which future outcomes are being con-
sidered (time discounting), and how agents deal with uncertainties concerning the system they are interacting
with (e.g., natural environment, economy, weather, climate) and the behaviour of other agents (social reason-
ing). Whereas from a rational actor approach these questions open a set of very diicult to answer questions,
at the same time psychology oers several theories on themechanisms people use to process information and
make decisions in a variety of situations. Hence in making more realistic assumptions on the micro-level be-
haviour of agents it is scientifically sound to use psychological theories as the basis for the implementation of
agent rules.
3.3 Implementing behavioural theory in agent rules confronts themodeller with a number of challenges (Schlüter
et al. 2017; Jager & Ernst 2017). The first challenge deals with the identification of relevant theories on human
cognition and (social) decision-making. There exists an abundance of theories on behaviour from social sci-
ences suchas economics, psychology, anthropology, sociologyandpolitical science. These theories range from
being very detailed and specific, such as the role of emotion (anger) in the social punishment in social dilem-
mas (Hopfensitz & Reuben 2009) to very generic theories such as the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen 1991).
The theories thus are addressing dierent levels of aggregation and are oen overlapping (or nested), making
it diicult to identify and select the most appropriate theory to implement in modelling a specific behavioural
dynamic.
3.4 The second challenge deals with the lack of formalisation of many social scientific theories. Whereas most
behavioural theories are based on statistical relations (correlations), in using them in agent-based models we
have to make these theories computational (causal mechanisms). This implies that we have to translate the
theoretical notions into causal descriptions that allow for computational modelling (Ernst 2010; Jager & Ernst
2017). One problem here is the descriptive levels of theories confront themodellers with logical gaps thatmust
be filled in order to make a simulation work. Modellers need to make assumptions to fill such gaps (Sawyer
2004). A next problem is that most behavioural theories start with behavioural drivers and endwith behaviour.
In computational models, behaviour results in outcomes that serve as drivers of the behaviour in a next step.
Hence, in making theories computable, this causal loop has to be closed. The statistical grounding of many
theories provides us with another challenge. Whereas statistical grounding is based on average eect sizes, we
need to address population heterogeneity to model social dynamics.
3.5 It is understandable that the rational choice model is oen used in modelling behaviour because it gives some
clear and relatively easy to implement guidelines. However, at the same time, we are aware of the relevance
of more complicated processes in human cognition and decision making that are important in studying social
dynamics. Therefore, in the following we will provide an overview of a number of social simulation applica-
tions that use social scientific theory in studying dierent social dynamical phenomena. This overview will be
far from complete, but will serve to give insight in a few theories that have been successfully implemented to
address certain social phenomena.
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Examples of Applications of Social-Psychological Theory in Social Simu-
lation
4.1 Recently, social simulation applications that implement psychological, sociological and behavioural theory
have been increasing. In this section, we want to briefly discuss a number of simulation applications as an
example of some relevant dierent theories being implemented in dierent contexts. It is not our intention
to describe in detail how the theories have been implemented. Rather our exhibit is meant to provide the in-
terested reader with an overview of existing applications, and we refer the reader to the original publications
for getting more detailed information on the precise implementation. We will organise this exhibit around a
number of theoretical approaches and theories.
Theory of normative conduct
4.2 Oneof thekeydriversofbehaviour that are important inunderstanding social influenceare social norms. Hence
in the field of social psychology, abundant research has been conducted on how norms operate and influence
humanbehaviour (Cialdini &Goldstein 2004). Basically, compliance tonorms serves three goals. First, accuracy
refers to the goal of being accurate about vital facts. Second, ailiation refers to the goal of having meaningful
relations with others. Third, maintaining a positive self-concept by keeping a consistent set of values. Cialdini
et al. (1991) make a distinction between three types of norms. Descriptive norms guide behaviour via the per-
ception of how most others would behave. Injunctive norms guide behaviour via the perception of how most
others would approve/disapprove of a person’s conduct. Finally, personal norms guide the behaviour via the
perception of how a person would approve/disapprove of his own conduct.
4.3 Within the context of social simulation, the modelling of norms is a critical issue, as normative influence is
one of the key mechanisms of social influence. A recent overview on modelling norms has been provided by
Elsenbroich &Gilbert (2014). A very simple implementation of normative influence can be based on aweighting
function where a distinction is being made between personal and social outcomes of performing a particular
behaviour. For example, Delre et al. (2007) implement the impacts of norms on the diusion of an innovation if
at least one of their neighbours have already adopted the product. To do so, they make a distinction between
individual preference and social influence, anddefine a simpleweighted utility: Uij = βij ∗xij+(1−(βij)∗yij .
In this formula, yij refers to the social need, and the satisfactionof thisbyadoptingproduct j byagent idepends
on the proportion of neighbouring agents adopting product j as well. Obviously, the value of β indicates the
relative importance of the norm, where agents having a β value close to 0 are mainly focussing on the norm,
whereas agents having aβ close to 1 are only looking at the product characteristics. In the process of innovation
diusion this distinction proves to be critical.
4.4 The social-cognitive representation of norms in agents by Conte & Castelfranchi (1995); Conte & Paolucci (2001,
2002); Conte et al. (2013) provide a theoretically elaboratedmodelling approach. This approach has developed
anumber ofmodels that focus onparticular social phenomena suchas social learning, norms (Conte&Paolucci
2001), and reputation (Conte & Paolucci 2002) and relate these to the underlying cognitive basis. An important
process is the internalisation of norms, which is being addressed by the framework EMIL-I-A (EMIL Internalizer
Agent, Conte et al. (2013)). Aer agents have been exposed to the normative behaviours of others and to their
(explicit or implicit) normative requests, agents potentially acquire those normative beliefs. The normative be-
liefs are based on three components, respectively (1) the basic belief that there is a norm, (2) the belief that
the norm applies to the agent (or the group the agent belongs to), and (3) the belief that compliance and viola-
tions of the normwill be rewarded or sanctioned. Before internalization, an agent can engage in a cost-benefit
analysis in deciding to comply with the norm. However, once internalized, the agent will comply to the norm
independently of external sanctions and rewards.
4.5 The examples above indicate that norms can be modelled with dierent levels of detail. If one is exploring
the cognitive dynamics of norm development, a theoretically elaborated model is required. However, if just a
simple social influence should be modelled in e.g. an applied model, a much simpler implementation can be
justified. Moreover, additional issues can be relevant in modelling norms, such as who is interacting with who,
which relates to the impact of similarity and associated opinion dynamics that will be discussed below.
Goal Frame Theory
4.6 Whilemuchworkonnormsdoesnot really address thechangeofnormsasaneectofobservedbehaviour, Cial-
dini et al. (1990) showed that people are very susceptible to the littering behaviour of other people. Goal Frame
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Theory explicitly addresses the change of the importance of dierent goals as a function of public (dis)respect
for a norm (Lindenberg & Steg 2007). As such, the normative influence is placed within a wider motivational
framework, and the importance of the goals are subject to change. Three goal frames are distinguished by (Lin-
denberg & Steg 2007): the hedonic goal "to feel better right now", the gain goal "to guard and improve one’s
resources", and the normative goal "to act appropriately". In a littering context the hedonicmotivewould focus
ongetting rid of a piece of litter, e.g. by throwing it on the street or in abin, whereas thenormativemotivewould
focus on keeping the environment clean, e.g. by throwing litter in a bin or to keep it with you.
4.7 The Goal Frame Theory has been implemented in the context of household appliances purchase and replace-
ment (Polhill 2015) and in a smartmetering context (Vasiljevska et al. 2017). These applications used a fixed set-
ting for the goals. Rangoni & Jager (2017) formalised changingweights of the dierent goals, and addressed the
dynamics of norms as depending on the degree of littering in the agent’s environment. This approach "closed
the loop" in the sense that collective behaviour influences individual littering behaviour, which feeds forward
to agent’s decision to litter in a next time-step. In the model an agent i is initialized having a norm goal weight
Ni (0,100) and a hedonic goal (inverse). The agent i looks at the tiles surrounding him. Lit (0,100) is defined
as the proportion of tiles holding one or more units of litter at time t. A threshold TNiT (0,100) is defined for
agent i, representing his tolerance to litter. Hence, agent i will regard the environment as clean if TNi > Lit.
Agent i updates his current normative goal weightNit. For TNi < Lit he will regard the norm as disrespected
and his normative goal weight will be weakened. Hence,Nit = Nit−1 −Nit ∗RwhereR is the reinforcement
magnitude, being the same for all agents. On the other hand, for TNi > Lit agent I will regard the norm as
respected and his normative goal weight will be reinforced. Hence,Nit = Nit−1 +Nit ∗R.
4.8 While it was possible to parameterise the simulation model to replicate the empirical results of a littering field
experiment (Keizer et al. 2011), themodel usedhad tomake somecrudeassumptions. In particular, the function
thatdescribedmagnitudeof the reinforcementwasnotbasedonempirical databecauseof a lackof experimen-
tal data on that. Whereas the principles of reinforcement learning are rooted in behaviourist psychology, which
originates from principles of classical and operant conditioning (Pavlov & Anrep 1927; Skinner 1990), not much
is known from specific functions that can be used to parameterise the reinforcement process. Next, also no
data is available concerning the heterogeneity in the population concerning the existence of specific thresh-
olds for litter, and it can be assumed that these thresholds dier depending on the situation (e.g. own garden
versus festival area). As such, the implementation of dynamic norms confronts the modeller with a number of
unknowns that requires the use of crude assumptions.
Similarity Theory
4.9 An important finding in studying interpersonal influence and attraction is the role of similarity. This is oen
expressed in popular language as "birds of a feather flock together". Theory on similarity/attraction has been
proposed by Festinger (1954); Berscheid & Walster (1969); Byrne (1971). The basic idea is that people find it
pleasant to have similar attitudes as other people in their environment. Thiswill contribute to a feeling of group
belongingness and safety, and prevent people from having a fear of social exclusion. Furthermore, the concept
of homophily is being used in addressing congruency or similarity on attributes such as demographic variables,
beliefs and values (e.g., Infante et al. 1997). Additionally the behaviour of similar people is more likely to be
copied because it falls in the range of a person’s possibilities (comparable abilities/resources). Hence, people
with a moderate income are acquiring more personal relevant information from observing the behaviour of
about equal income others than from observing much poorer or richer people.
4.10 A first implementation of similarity theory has been done by Schelling (1971), who demonstrated that in an eth-
nicallymixed society, where the individuals prefermerely not to be in aminority in their local neighbourhood, a
completely segregated society emerges as a result. Schelling’s social computational model was one of the first
where a certain preference for being in the neighbourhood of similar others was implemented.
4.11 The similarity principle is widely being used in social simulation as a mechanism to regulate the interaction
between agents. A critical issue here is the factors that are being used for determining the similarity between
agents. One possibility is using one or several fixed traits of agents to determine the distance between them.
This can be used to model e.g. similarity on e.g. ethnicity (Schelling 1971) or calculate a Euclidian distance
between agents based on several traits such as age, spatial location and gender. This allows creating a fixed
similarity based network of interacting agents. Another possibility is to make the probability of two agents
interacting dependent on their similarity. This produces a network where in principle all agents can interact,
but the more similar the agent, the more likely they interact.
4.12 Instead of using fixed factors in determining the similarity in the beginning of the simulation, in some studies
it may be relevant to make similarity a dynamic factor and allow for networks to change. For example, when
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the actions of agents matter in determining their relevance for social comparison, agents may be equipped
with a mechanism to (continuously) follow the similarity of other agents. For example, Speelman (2014) used
a similarity function for modelling the chance of farmers to interact on their physical proximity, the crop they
were growing and the income they generated. As a result, changing of crop and change in income would also
aect the chances of farmer agents to interact. This makes sense concerning the relevance of comparisons, as
it is more relevant for a farmer to exchange information with farmers growing the same crop and having about
the same financial means.
4.13 Using concepts of similarity theory in static or dynamic ways contributes to developing more psychologically
relevant network structures between agents. Instead of using random networks, small-world networks (e.g.,
Watts 1999), scale-free networks (e.g., Barabási & Albert 1999), and apply principles of preferential attachments
based on the existing number of links (e.g., Amaral et al. 2000), it is also possible to develop both static and
dynamic networks using insights on similarity theory. However, as discussed in the above, there are dierent
waysof implementing this, andexisting theoriesonsimilarityprinciplesonlyaddress themicro level, anddonot
provide substantive evidence on the relations between dierent types of similarity and the resulting network
structures. For the social simulator it is a challenge to reflect on what dimensions of similarity are relevant in
exploring the behavioural dynamics in a particular context. In some contexts, more simple and computational
eicient implementations can be used than in other contexts. Ultimately, a thorough understanding of the
empirical case is needed tomakeagroundeddecisiononhowto implementprinciplesof similarity inmodelling
the interactions between agents.
Social Judgement Theory and opinion dynamics
4.14 Opiniondynamics is a very relevant domain that is being studiedwith social simulationmodels. Much literature
and simulation models address the attraction between people and their opinions (e.g., Hegselmann & Krause
2002). The field of opinion dynamics is a specific case where similarity eects play an important role. People
are being attracted to other people having similar beliefs and opinions, and adjust their beliefs and opinions
to match them. However, also the opposite eect may happen, where people contrast themselves with peo-
ple having significantly dierent beliefs and opinions. In addressing the impact of similarities/dierences in
opinions on the development of these opinions, Sherif & Hovland (1961) propose a theory that describes how
individuals change their position aer being confrontedwith another position. Social Judgement Theory states
that if people’s advocated positions are relatively close, an assimilation eect will occur. If the positions are far
apart, a contrast eect will occur, driving their positions apart. The latter eect seems to be very important in
understanding eects of polarisation. However, the contrast eect oen seems to play aminor role in compari-
son to the positive attitude shis following positive interactions (Takács et al. 2016). Inmodelling acculturation
processes such as assimilation, integration, separation and marginalisation (Berry 1984), contract eects may
be relevant in understanding the lack of further interactions between groups aer some first negative interac-
tions.
4.15 An implementation of Social Judgement Theory (SJT) has been done by Jager & Amblard (2005). In simulating
opinion dynamics, they formalised two thresholds. If an opinion dierence is smaller than u, and assimilation
eect will occur (lattitude of acceptance). If a dierence is larger than t, a contrast eect will occur (lattitude
of rejectance). If the dierence is between u and t no change will happen (lattitude of non-commitment. In
formula:
If |xi − xj | < ui then dxi = µ · (xj − xi)
If |xi − xj | > ti then dxi = µ · (xi − xj)
where xi is the opinion of agent i, xj the opinion of agent j, dx is the opinion change, and the parameter µ
controls for the strength of influence.
4.16 This formalisationopens thepossibility of experimentingwith heterogeneity in thepopulation concerning their
threshold levels and their impact on the resulting opinion dynamics. However, the argumentative part of this
model is very simple, addressing only a one-dimensional opinion, and having a very simple rule for changing
the opinion. Themultidimensionality of opinions, and the impact of e.g. reputation and expertise of the agents
are not included in this formalisation. Stefanelli & Seidl (2016) address the opinions concerning deep geologi-
cal nuclear waste repositories in Switzerland, where dimensions of safety and economic benefits are included.
More elaborate models addressing processes of persuasion are proposed by e.g. Dignum et al. (2001) and Dyk-
stra et al. (2015), who include processes of reasoning on when to engage in an interaction and the degree of
persuasive power. Salzarulo (2006) implemented the principle of Self Categorisation Theory (Turner et al. 1987)
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in simulating processes of opinion dynamics. Considering that the field of opinion dynamics is a very relevant
research domain it seems important to further explore how insights and theories originating from smaller scale
laboratory experiments can be implemented and tested in a social simulation context.
Elaboration Likelihood Model
4.17 A well known theory on human persuasion processes is the Elaboration Likelihood Model of Petty & Cacioppo
(1986). Theymake a distinction between central processing, which deals with the processing of arguments and
information, versus peripheral processing, which is based on the processing of cues rather than arguments and
information. Cues here refer to source eects, such as the respect a person has, the charisma of e.g. politicians
and the trust onehas in theknowledgeof friendsandacquaintances. Whenaperson is notmotivatedor capable
to process information, oen these social cues will serve as a driver of opinion formation and change.
4.18 In implementing this process in a simulationmodel, Jager & Amblard (2007) expanded the formalisation of the
Social Judgement Theory by adding a second opinion dimension. The basic idea was that people like to have
similar opinions as people they interact with (Festinger 1954). Hence when people assimilate on an important
opinion dimension (central processing), it is likely that they will also assimilate unimportant - and unrelated -
opinions following peripheral processing. Even if these unimportant opinions are far apart, due to the assimila-
tion eect on the basis of experienced similarity on an important dimension, the assimilation eect will occur
here as well. Formalised for an important opinion A and an unimportant opinion B this results in the following
formalisation:
If |xAi − xAj | < ui then dxAi = µ · (xAj − xAi) , and dxBi = µ · (xBj − xBi)
If |xAi − xAj | > ti then dxAi = µ · (xAi − xAj) , and dxBi = µ · (xBi − xBj).
4.19 Here the change on the unimportant dimension B is completely dependent on the change on the important di-
mension A. This formalisation is very simple, and does not account for the empirical fact that attitude changes
following peripheral processing are usually not persistent. Other issues that appear to be relevant in this ap-
proach are the parameterisation of howmuch opinion change occurs (µ) as a function of the strength of argu-
ments and the strength of peripheral cues. Whereas empirical eects have been found, these do not provide
clear indications for parameterising µ in a valid manner.
4.20 A theoretically more elaborated application of the Elaboration Likelihood Model is presented by Mosler et al.
(2001). They formalised the ELM in an agent-based model and compared simulated individuals’ reactions to
stimuliwith theexperimental and statistical observed reactionsof real participants in experiments. Theirmodel
describes a systems theoretical description of the elaboration Likelihood model, and in formulas the transi-
tional dynamics are being defined. Hence, the model is composed of functional blocks, such as elaboration
motivation, ability and likelihood, bias position and attitude. The input received by every block is being pro-
cessed within the block following an algorithm, and generates output towards another block. The simulation
model was tested against empirical studies that had been published before by other researchers. Replication
of the results was considered a successful implementation. A diiculty in the implementation was that the em-
pirical data were not complete. For example, no data were available on the initial attitude of the respondents,
and hence assumptions had to bemade concerning the agents’ properties.
4.21 The results of the experiments are interesting in the sense that dynamical processes of attitude change are
generated, demonstrating for example how strong versus weak arguments may influence attitudes at dierent
times during the process, and agents may switch between central and peripheral processing. As such Mosler
et al. (2001) provide an interesting example of how a psychological theory can be translated in a dynamical
context using social simulation.
4.22 These examples demonstrate that themore close amodeller gets to the original studies, themore assumptions
have to be made concerning the precise implementation and settings of the model. The results are important
because they address how changes in beliefs and opinions spread in a social setting depending on the elabora-
tion processes agents engage in as a function of their motivation, cognitive capacity and appeal of the source.
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB)
4.23 The Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen 1991) brings together a number of components in predicting human
behaviour. Behaviour (action) is considered to be driven by a behavioural intention, which in turn is aected
by a person’s attitude, the social norm associated with the behaviour in question and the behavioural control.
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Figure 2: The Theory of Planned Behaviour (source, Wikipedia).
The attitude towards performing a behaviour is basically a weighted multi attribute subjective utility function,
where attitudes concerning the evaluation of behavioural outcomes are weighted in a total attitude score. The
social norm combines the perceived behaviour of relevant other people and themotivation to complywith this
behaviour. Thebehaviour of relevant other people is closely related to the earlier discussed theoryof normative
conduct, goal frame theory and similarity theory. The motivation to comply refers to personal characteristics,
and may be used to make a distinction between conformists, nonconformists and anti-conformists. Finally,
behavioural control is an important driver, addressing the (perceived) possibility to perform thebehaviour. This
refers to possible financial, technical and physical barriers to perform a particular behaviour.
4.24 Using TPB in social simulation models brings this framework in a dynamical context, where the behaviour of
one agent serves as the (normative or informative) input for another agent later. Moreover, in principle a so-
cial simulation model would allow for formalising (groups of) agents that dier concerning e.g. the relative
importance of beliefs, susceptibility for norms and control beliefs.
4.25 In the context of innovation diusion, the TPB allows for translating empirical data on the beliefs concerning
the dierent outcomes of behaviours/technical adoptions into the valuation function of agents. For example,
Mosler et al. (2001) used the TPB to model in studying the dynamics of interventions aimed at recycling, com-
postingand re-useofmaterials. Empiricaldatacollected fromaproject inCubawerebeingused toparameterise
the model. The simulation experiments showed the potential eicacy of dierent interventions, including the
impact of social dynamics.
4.26 Schwarz & Ernst (2009) studied the diusion of water-saving shower-heads, a toilet flush and a rain harvesting
system given scenarios of future droughts and dierent policies. Empirical data were being collected and used
to construct the agents’ attitude, social normandperceived behavioural control based on data on environmen-
tal performance, ease of use, saving of costs, compatibility with existing infrastructure and investment costs.
Whereas in most empirical studies using the TPB framework the focus is on average statistical eects, in social
simulation there is the important option to address heterogeneity in the agents. Schwarz&Ernst addressed this
using a segmentation strategy based on socio-cultural characteristics of groups, e.g. established conservatives,
escapists and traditionalist. The results demonstrated that attitudes and perceived behavioural control had an
important impact on the adoption ofwater saving innovations, whereas communication in social networkswas
less important. Their study was capable of generating policy scenarios demonstrating how water-saving inno-
vations would spread through dierent socioeconomic groups throughout the country of Germany.
4.27 The TPB has inspired several modellers in developing social simulation models. Early applications are for ex-
ample addressing resource management (Ernst 1998) and household waste management (Tucker et al. 1999).
The TPB is currently being used in a variety of simulation models addressing dierent topics, such as political
attitudesandvotingbehaviour (Kottonau&Pahl-Wostl 2004), alcohol consumptiondynamics (Moyoet al. 2015),
ChildMaltreatment prevention (Hu&Keller 2015), the use of smart energymetering in Europe (Vasiljevska et al.
2017) and waste management (Scalco et al. 2017).
4.28 Many social simulations have also employed the BDI (Belief Desire Intention) approach in formalising agents’
decision making (see for a review e.g. Balke & Gilbert 2014). This approach can be interpreted as a way of
formalising the attitude-intention relationwithin the TPB context. However, the BDI approach does not include
social interaction and normative influence, which are important aspects in behavioural dynamics.
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Integratedmodels
4.29 The Theory of Planned Behaviour already oers a more integrated model compared to the more specific pro-
cesses addressed by norms, similarity and persuasion models. As such, principles of e.g. similarity and norms
can be logically applied in a TPB framework. Several researchers have been working on developing modelling
architectures that incorporate dierent behavioural mechanisms and principles. These integrated models are
oen used tomodel a variety of behaviours and decision-making processes in awider ormulti-layered context.
4.30 Brousmiche et al. (2016) address cognition and attitudes in amodel of opinion dynamics. They propose Polias,
a modelling framework that is mainly based on Fazio’s (2007) cognitive model of attitude formation. Polias is
groundedondierent insights fromsocial psychology, and it combines ideasonattitude formationandchange.
In Polias attitudes are composedof a cognitive andemotional component. They are representedasmemory as-
sociations between evaluations and the social object with varying accessibilities. Information can be obtained
throughdirect observation, communication in the community followingaSmallWorldnetwork structure (Watts
1999), and actor specific information (informative strategy). Communication results in belief revision, which is
relevant to study opinion dynamics. Polias is a generic model of attitude formation, and could be applied to
any application domain. In Brousmiche et al. (2016) the model is being applied to study the attitude impact of
French forces conducting stabilization operations in Afghanistan.
4.31 Another example of amore integrated psychologicalmodel is the InnoMind simulationmodel (Schröder &Wolf
2017). InnoMind is based on theories of emotional cognition from cognitive science, theories of attitudes and
persuasion from social psychology, and theories of social networks from sociology. Agents’ attitudes are rep-
resented as constraint-satisfaction networks. InnoMind uses artificial neural networks to model individual at-
titudes as parallel constraint satisfaction. The nodes in the neural network represent single concepts, and the
links between them represent relationships between the concepts. The activation of nodes corresponds with
cognitive salience. The attitude change following interaction can follow a more central route or a peripheral
route, as discussed earlier in the section on the Elaboration Likelihood Model. The communication within the
simulated society is based on an artificial social network. This network is based on geographic proximity of
agents, the size of agent’ egocentric social networks, which may vary depending personality, and on similarity
concerning socio-demographic variables. Schröder & Wolf (2017) use empirical data from inhabitants of Berlin
to study the attitude dynamics on car-sharing in the city of Berlin. The model oers possibilities to explore the
potential attitude dynamics as a consequence of dierent campaigns to promote car-sharing.
4.32 In the context of land use change the FEARLUS framework (Polhill et al. 2001; Gotts & Polhill 2009) addresses
dierent aggregation layers. Land use is being aected by the biophysical attributes of the land, the decisions
that are being made on the land use, the ownership structure of the land and finally the climate and economy.
Concerning the behaviour of the agents, the decisions on land-use address farmers’ decision making in this
multi-layered environment. The agents can engage in satisficing, imitation, and innovation. Which of these
strategies is being used depends on both the agent characteristics as their (economic) performance. For exam-
ple, the agent’s aspiration level indicates how satisfied it is with a certain yield. When satisfied, the agent will
continue to use the land as before, which refers to habitual behaviour. Obviously, this yield is partly determined
by climatic and economic circumstances, and hence both personal and situational factors come together in the
agents’ decision-making. When the agent is not satisfied, it can either engage in imitation of innovation, de-
pending on the personal settings of the agent. This setting refers back to the social susceptibility in TPB and
normative influence. Imitation can be formalised in dierent ways, e.g. simple imitation based on a weighted
random choice of all neighbours, or yield-based imitation including the success as a decisive factor.
4.33 TheConsumatapproach (Jager et al. 2000) is anexampleof a framework that oers ageneric conceptual frame-
work that combines and connects dierent decision strategies such as habitual behaviour, imitation, social
learning anddeliberatedecision-making. A recent applicationaddresses thediusionof hybrid and full-electric
cars (Kangur et al. 2017). In this simulation model, data of 1795 respondents were used to parameterise 1795
agents. Using detailed data on driving behaviour, attitudes towards charging speed, range, environmental con-
cern, social susceptibility, involvement with cars, preferences for models and the like an artificial population
was constructed. Experiments allowed for testing eects of technical innovationand supportive (financial) poli-
cies. Especially in the context of innovation diusion such integratedmodels appear to be capable of capturing
how behavioural change spreads in a context where habits play an important role.
Challenges Ahead
5.1 In the previous sections, a number of applications were discussed of implementations of psychological theory
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in social simulation. These applications demonstrate that EROS – enhancing realism of simulation – is sup-
ported by the implementation of dierent psychological theories. The abovementioned listing of applications
is not meant to be a complete review of all possible applications, and is biased towards the dierent projects
the author was working on earlier, but the key message is that there is a clear case for implementing psycho-
logical theory in social simulationmodel to improve the realism of the behavioural dynamics we are interested
in to explore.
5.2 A first insight is that just as in empirical experimental social scientific research, also within social simulation
research several theories are being implemented independently. These applications are relevant to study how
the insights from the theories would operate in a dynamical context. A good example here is the work of Conte
(e.g., Conte & Giardini 2016), implementing rich ideas from cognitive social science in social simulationmodels
to improve our thinking about the propagation of norms through society. At this level wemay consider psycho-
logical grounded social simulation research as contributions towards the development of behaviour dynamical
theories.
5.3 A second insight is that there is an increased interest for integrating behaviour theoretical insights in a mod-
elling framework. Specifically when processes of behavioural change are the topic of interest, be it farmers’
choice behaviour, recycling behaviour or citizens’ future mobility, the aforementioned examples indicate that
the integration of dierent psychological mechanisms in a modelling framework contributes to the develop-
ment of policy relevant models. Because the psychological drivers and dynamics of behaviour are included in
these models, they can address social psychological responses to policy that go beyond the capacity of tradi-
tional economic and spatial models. Moreover, they oer the possibility to study impacts of e.g. informational
campaigns, and include the opinion dynamics as second order eects of informational campaigns. At this level
of modelling we see glimpses of a more integrated dynamical theory of human behaviour emerging, closing
the gap between (social) psychology at the micro-level and sociology at the macro-level, allowing to conduct
experiments onmore realistically behaving artificial populations.
5.4 In both types of implementation, the researcherwill by definition run into the limitations concerningour knowl-
edge on how various psychological processes work. Whereasmodelling human behaviour in computermodels
forces the researcher to develop running code, and hence make inferences on the causal mechanisms for the
simulated agent, the psychological theories are not formalised at this level. Currently, we see social simula-
tion increasingly being used by psychologists because it opens new possibilities to do research aer how we
operate in groups, and howwe as a species interact with our natural environment. Themore we are capable of
implementing behavioural theory in computer coded models, the more we are capable of simulating relevant
behavioural processes that informusabout thedynamicsof ourownbehaviour. Hence, social simulationopens
thepossibility to study thedynamicsof behaviour, andprovides aplatform todevelopdynamical social psycho-
logical and sociological theory. Moreover, the social simulation of human behaviour in more realistic settings
forces themodeller to implement dierent psychologicalmechanisms in an integratedmodel. As such, the for-
malisation of theory requires making causal links between dierent mechanisms (e.g. similarity and attitudes
and opinion dynamics), and thus contributes to the development of more integrated or meta-behavioural the-
ory.
5.5 In further developing a more integrated theory of behaviour, or perhaps less ambitious, an integrated frame-
work for modelling human behaviour, two challenges that seem to be relevant are the modelling of human
needs as the drivers of behaviour, andmodellingmore elaborate cognitive processes to better represent learn-
ing and decision-making.
5.6 Modelling human needs is a complicated challenge for social simulation, as there exists a relation between
dierent brain systems, their evolutionary background and associated needs (e.g., Deci & Ryan 2000). Needs
refer to the motivation all living creatures share as a drive to maintain or improve the well-being of the organ-
ism. Whereas for plants the needs seem to be relatively simple, more developed species may have dierent
needs, and humans are a species where needs have evolved into a complicated set of drives that sometimes
conflictwith one another. Whereasmost simulated agents have a goal they aspire for, and sometimes evenmul-
tiple, sometimes conflicting goals, there are no agent architectures that capture the dierent needs that people
have, their specific time-dimensionality (e.g. short term like thirst versus long-term like self-actualisation) and
their activation (focus) in combination. Yet dierent needs are implicitly or explicitly modelled in agents, rang-
ing from simple needs addressing food, to social needs that are quite common in social simulation models,
to complex needs such as self-actualisation. Concerning the modelling of a more complex need such as self-
actualisation, the simulationmodel of Heise (2013) addressing small group behaviour is a nice example. In this
model, aect-control theory (MacKinnon 1994) is being used tomodel self-actualisation as amore-dimensional
(Evaluation, Potency, and Activity) aective meaning of behaviour. However, developing a framework that ad-
dresses e.g. Maslow’s needs pyramid (1954) or the lesser-known taxonomies proposed by e.g. Max-Neef (1992)
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andKenrick et al. (2010) remains a challenge in simulating themultiplebehavioural drivers of humanbehaviour.
5.7 Modelling cognition is another big challenge in social simulation, and some interesting examples have been
discussed in this paper such as the work of Conte et al. (2013), Brousmiche et al. (2016) and Schröder & Wolf
(2017). These examples bring a richer cognitive modelling perspective within the context of simulating social
interaction. The field of cognitivemodelling is currently mainly oriented onmodelling a single actor, and these
cognitive-social models are an important step in bringing cognitive modelling into a social context. Looking
at the field of cognitive modelling, a main distinction can be made between rule-based, connectionist, and
Bayesian approaches (see e.g., Thagard 2012) for an overview. In particular, the advances in the connectionist
approach, where cognitive processes are modelled at the neural level are impressive. With computer models
mimicking dynamic neural networks, it is possible to simulate these processes on a biological level. Models
composed of millions of simulated neurons are being used to simulated complex cognitive processes such as
pattern recognition and associated actions (e.g., Eliasmith et al. 2012). However, realizing the vast complexity
of themanydierent interacting brain systems and regions, and themanydierent chemical-electric processes
thathavebeen identified, buildinganartificial but realistically functioningbrain that canbeused ina social sim-
ulation context to simulate human society seemsat least a very distant goal. Whereasmuch research is focusing
on simulating a human brain, for example the EU Flagship Human Brain Project endowed with a funding of a
billion euro for more than 100 institutions (https://www.humanbrainproject.eu/en/), problems remain in
replicating a single brain because of the incompatibility of many data on the human brain.
5.8 Simpler, but still rather complex cognitive models have been developed to simulate human cognition, such
as SOAR (Wray & Jones 2006; Laird et al. 1987), ACT-R (Anderson et al. 2004; Anderson 2013), and CLARION
(Heckbert et al. 2006; Sun 1997). Whereas these architectures address individual cognition, in particular Sun
(2012) advocates the importance of connecting cognitive models to social simulation models.
5.9 Whereas a stronger collaboration, and possible assimilation of social simulators and behavioural and cogni-
tive theorists would certainly contribute to the further development of more theoretically realistic and sound
simulation models, we should bear in mind that there is a fundamental diiculty in quantifying behavioural
principles into simulationmodels. We thus have to keep inmind the quote of Box (1984), stating that "all mod-
els are wrong, but some are useful". Just as the metaphors of humans being like steam engines with subcon-
scious pressures and the need to let of steam (e.g. Freud), or the brain operating like a telephone exchange
(behaviourists), the computer metaphor that we use today does not capture how human drives and cognition
operate (e.g., Chemero 2013). Hence, while it is tempting to model a memory and the process as decision-
making as an information storage system (memory) and a rule based system for selecting a behaviour (com-
puting algorithms), this neglects for example the importance of subconscious processes (gut feeling) that ap-
pear to be highly relevant in human perception, evaluation, motivation and behaviour, (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al.
2006; Bargh & Morsella 2008). Whereas experiments for example demonstrate better decision-making in com-
plex situationswhen people process subconsciously, the underlying cognitive processes are hard to access and
diicult to formalise. In a same vein, dierences between forward looking (imaginative) versus backwards (ex-
perience, memory) thinking that seem to be important in society (e.g., Fortunato & Furey 2012), remain largely
unexplored in social simulation contexts because these would require very elaborate cognitive models.
5.10 Implementing human cognition and behaviour in social simulation models ultimately remains a translation
task of a wide variety of psychological processes into binary computer code, where by definition information is
lost. Hence, modesty should be upholded concerning the realism of the models we develop, because oen we
do not know the fundamental limitations of using the computer metaphor. Yet, as the papers discussed here
demonstrate, progress is being made in modelling behavioural dynamics using cognitive, social psychological
and sociological theory. Whereas this computer modelling of human behaviour and cognition is still in its in-
fancy, andhuge challenges are aheadof us in developing a better understanding of howweas a species operate
on Earth, important steps are made by formalising these theories in dynamical contexts. With a suicient dose
of imagination this development of a dynamical psychology driven by social simulation may be interpreted as
Psyche being waked up by the kiss of Eros.
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